nationalist sentiments in pre-independence struggles were often pitted against repressive colonial forest services, it could be hypothesized that independence would bring regimes more responsive to local concerns and more likely to heed resistance. Yet such a view, focusing simply on state capacity in changing political contexts, overlooks qualitative changes in the configuration of science-policy relationships within the state, a reconfiguration that it is necessary to grasp if we are to understand how postcolonial forest policy was less a rupture than a continuation or, indeed, reinforcement.
     
In the first decades of the colonial period, a particular set of ideas concerning desiccation became firmly established within forestry science and forest policy circles in each colony in humid West Africa. Those involved came to share the general view that deforestation and the de-wooding of savannas led to decreased local rainfall and to disruption of hydrological cycles and downstream water flow. It led to soil degradation, with the loss of vegetation cover and over use leading to reduced organic matter and soil humidity. In response, there was a considerable coherence in policy across the region to reserve upwards of - per cent of the humid forest as reserves, an amount considered sufficient to stabilize rainfall in these regions, and to site many forest reserves to protect river headwaters or to form a curtain on the northern margins of the humid forest region to protect it from anticipated desiccation and savannisation. That a conformity of analysis and policy aims emerged across West Africa reflected both the adoption of well-established ideas already prevalent outside West Africa and the ' small world ' of forestry science and policy in the region.
Many of the scientists who came to observe and work in West Africa at the start of the colonial period were already strongly influenced by desiccationist ideas. In his analysis of forest issues in Co# te d'Ivoire, Chevalier for example quoted extensively from Poivre's eighteenth-century assertions that deforestation was leading to desiccation in Mauritius.$ Moloney, in one early influential publication, interpreted phenomena that he considered indicative of deforestation-led desiccation in Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria in the light of Alexander von Humboldt's early nineteenth-century analysis and the apparent experience of other British colonies with deforestation and desiccation.% Thompson, in his analysis of Ghana, cited a study by Walter on forest cover and rainfall, also in Mauritius.& More significantly, most early British foresters in West Africa had been schooled in the forest departments of India and Burma which, as Grove has demonstrated,' had become central to inquiry into and orthodoxy about the impact of deforestation on climate in the nineteenth century. H. N. Thompson, the first trained forester in the Nigerian Forest Department, had earlier worked in India and Burma. Thompson was then employed to detail Ghana's forests in , and once he had drawn up outlines for a forest service and legislation in Ghana (based on Nigerian and Indian legislation), he helped appoint the Indian-trained McLeod who had worked with Thompson in Nigeria to head it. As Ghana's forest department grew, the trained foresters it hired -Chipp, Gent, Moor -had all trained and served earlier in India or Burma. Indeed, Thompson specifically recommended recruitment from India. It was the second of Thompson's early subordinates in Nigeria (and his eventual successor), Unwin, also with experience in India, who was sent to detail Sierra Leone's forests in  and to outline the problematics and plans for a forest department there.
This ' small world ' of early British forestry and policy in West Africa is mirrored in French colonies. Between  and , Auguste Chevalier made extensive tours of Guinea, Co# te d'Ivoire, Togo and Dahomey, and the consistency of his ideas about desiccation in his reports became the basis for common analysis in each of these countries, linked within the colony of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française, AOF). Chevalier came to head both the Laboratoire d'Agronomie Coloniale from , and the
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Coloniaux was soon established for him. He was not modest when he claimed that it was his students who authored the pioneering works on forest botany and ecology in West Africa : Fleury and Porte ' res for Co# te d'Ivoire, and He! din for the Cameroun. ( There were links across the French and British forestry services from earliest times. Thus, for example, Chevalier visited Thompson in Nigeria in  and they visited the botanical garden and Olokomeji forest reserve together.) Thompson counted Chevalier as a friend.* Moreover, some British foresters, including Lane-Poole, had been trained at the French Imperial School at Nancy. He had been commissioned in  by the Sierra Leone Colony to prepare a report on the forests of Sierra Leone for the study conducted by Unwin two years previously."! He went into greater detail concerning the desiccation effect of deforestation there.
Grove, who details the nineteenth-century links between French and British ' typologies of anti-desiccation forest policy ', suggests that they were ' so closely interrelated that they can be said to have constituted a single ruling philosophy, rather than two separate traditions '."" These links between British and French colonies facilitated the early scientific depiction of West African vegetation. In various works between  and , the botanist Chevalier brought many of these together into a The scientists who imported and developed ideas about climate, soils and vegetation into the French colony of Guinea in the first decades of the twentieth century generally did so as consultants, frequently sent by the administration of AOF to visit and advise administrators alongside other missions, such as those establishing economically-focused botanical gardens. It was in such a capacity that the botanist Chevalier, for example, made systematic visits to district administrations between  and . His reports emphasized the importance of preserving remaining patches of forest, both because of their effects in conserving rainfall regimes and for their economic resources -especially wild rubber which was becoming a key colonial export product. His report on the vegetation of Kissidougou in the forest-savanna transition zone, for instance, considered it a model for the country :
The province of Kissi seems to us to fulfill currently what one must endeavour to obtain in all of Guinea. The managed forests there cover a rational area and alternate with de-wooded savannas and lands reserved for crops. Thanks to these forests the rainfalls are regularized, the agricultural lands are maintained and the indigenous inhabitants find … quantities of resources which do not exist in the bush in the strict sense of the word."* Yet here, as elsewhere, forests were seen to be seriously threatened by shifting cultivation for upland rice and by the bush fires set by local populations for farming and other purposes.#! Scientific consultants advised on measures to address these problems : restrictions on the setting of bush fires, and on ' destructive ' shifting cultivation and the establishment of forest reserves.
But in these early periods, such scientific and environmental concerns were often at odds with those of a political administration just beginning to claim control within rural areas. Cercle administrators generally considered their staff and influence too weak for restrictions on fire-setting to be remotely feasible. Token measures to restrict shifting cultivation were sometimes taken -in Kissidougou, for example, by fining village chiefs#" -but were generally ineffective. Furthermore, having in many cases gone to great lengths to install compliant local chiefs and relying on them for the administration of taxes and the recruitment of corve! e labour, administrators were generally unwilling to risk sacrificing their co-operation. In this context, both national and cercle administrators tended to consider reserve proposals as inadvisable. For example, the administrative response in  to Chevalier's proposed forest reserves in Fouta Djallon (the region which led the development of Guinea's environmental policy) was very negative :
When it comes to obtaining the benevolent agreement of inhabitants to assist us in securing the reserve against depredations, one can hardly count on it. The chiefs "* Archives Nationales de Se! ne! gal, Dakar (ANS), G : A. Chevalier, ' Rapport sur les nouvelles recherches sur les plantes a ' caoutchouc de la Guine! e française ', .
#! Archives Nationales de la Re! publique de Guine! e, Conakry (ANC), R : Nicolas, ' Etat de cultures indige ' nes ', Aug. .
#" ANC, D, Administrateur du Cercle de Kissidougou, rapport agricole du e trimestre, .
will promise in good faith, perhaps ; they will not be obeyed ; bush fires will be lit as usual, cattle will continue to graze customary pasture and if the inhabitants emerge from their passivity their action will translate into regrettable excess as the police force is hardly organized and the chiefs cannot count on exemplary repression to obtain by terror an obedience refused on their prestige alone. I therefore predict insurmountable difficulties and insurmountable complications if one adopts the project of M. Chevalier.## Seemingly, scientific imperatives had to be tempered to respond to political circumstances. Colonial conservation which had initially come in with more globalized land use plans was forced to adapt to Guinea's local administrative agendas. Local administrators either had views at odds with those articulated by the likes of Chevalier or at least relegated the importance of such views in accordance with the impossibility of implementation.#$ These forestry policies, weakly implemented if at all, had little significant impact on local populations.#% Local populations felt the impact of the colonial administration mainly in terms of the extraction of produce taxes and labour for porterage and military purposes. Certainly, these are the issues emphasized in oral accounts from Kissidougou which refer to the first decades of the twentieth century. As the district chief of Lokongo, in Lele country, put it : ' once the wars finished and the white people came, it was the problem of taxes which made us suffer, and the calling of our young men from the rice fields for corve! e'.#& Reflections on forest-related activities by the colonial administration at this time -except for exhortations to plant rubber -are notable for their absence, at least from the accounts we heard.#'
Colonial agricultural administrators also considered certain conservation agendas to contradict those of their own nascent department. Their development agendas focused on rebuilding regional food production following the disruption of late nineteenth-century and colonization-related warfare. In rice areas, for example, they were concerned to avoid measures that might discourage rice production. For instance, Brossart, the first director of Kissidougou's agricultural research station, acknowledged the threat that upland cultivation posed to forest patches but argued that conservation should be approached not through reservation, but through supporting two existing alternatives to upland rice cultivation. First, the positive incentive of rising rubber prices, it was thought, would induce farmers to abandon upland rice in favour of growing more rubber ; second, indigenous wetland rice cultivation was already practised effectively and could be actively encouraged.#( Concern at the threat to its independence partly underlay the repeated arguments of the agricultural administration that forestry should remain under its administrative control and that forest agendas should therefore remain subordinate to those of agriculture.#) Agricultural agendas gained further ascendancy within colonial development following the First World War when the national agriculture service began a series of attempts at large scale agricultural modernisation. These focused both on the settler plantation economy centred around Kindia and Boffa and in the forest region and savanna plains on large-scale ploughbased schemes for wetland rice.#* Amid these concerns, forest conservation agendas were again highly marginalized. The first full-time forestry personnel arrived in Guinea in , but were initially posted to the railway service where forestry attention was concentrated on supplying timber for sleepers and charcoal for fuel and also on protecting vegetation from fire caused by sparks.$! From the early s, seeds were sown for significant changes in the relationship between desiccation science and colonial development. This potential change was linked to the establishment of Guinea's national Service des Eaux et ForeV ts in , and -as was the case for similar nascent forestry services across West Africa at this time -the institutionalisation within it of prevailing scientific ideas about vegetation, climate and soils. As we shall discuss, a nexus of scientific thinking, practical policies and administrative imperatives emerged during this period, linked together essentially by desiccationist logic. Yet a number of factors were to limit its impact on the ground, both by comparison with some other West African countries and certainly by comparison with what was to transpire in Guinea after the Second World War. The implementation of anti-desiccation policy was to founder in the face of state and local opposition.
The heads of these new forestry services, if not actually scientists themselves, maintained much closer advisory links with scientists than had earlier administrators. Thus the head of Guinea's newly created service drew explicitly on Chevalier's ideas about the links between savannization, bush fire and soil erosion during his initial assessment tours.$" In the forest region, alarm about deforestation was now starting to be expressed in terms of the implications for the tree crops -coffee, cocoa, kola -grown in forest patches there. Fears were expressed that along with its forests, the region was losing its forest climate and thus its future potential to produce these forest crops, which in Guinea -rather later than in neighbouring Co# te d'Ivoire and Ghana -were starting to contribute to a valuable export trade. The forestry service in its annual reports argued forcibly that forest reserves needed to be established, especially in a ' curtain ' along the northern margins of the forest zone so as to inhibit the southwards spread of savannas.$# Thus were scientific logics concerning the southwards shifting of ever-drier vegetation zones inscribed into reserve plans. A number of such curtain reserves were designated, including Ouladin and Selly-Koro in the Cercle of Kissidougou in $$ and the larger Ziama reserve in the Cercle of Macenta ' of which the climatic effects are indisputable '.$% The botanist Adam, who was responsible for the reservation of Ziama, justified this on the basis of his analysis of progressive savannization of the area's forests as Maninka farmers, assumed to use forest-destructive agricultural technologies, migrated southwards into the forest zone. He argued that ' the advance of the savanna, which is an evident fact, could be prevented in this region '.$& In establishing reserves, the Guinean administration drew on the principle in operation throughout French West Africa at the time that the state was entitled to claim into its domain lands anything that could be deemed ' vacant et sans maıV tre '. Local rights to fell trees, set fires and farm were removed. But these policies encountered considerable local resistance and non-compliance.$' Around Selly-Koro, elders in the village of Bagbe recall with bitterness the reservation of land in their territory on hydrological grounds ; land which, in their interpretation, was fallow land controlled by village families and was in any case far from fully forested :
The white people said not to cultivate on the mountain there ; that was the limit of the forest. If the forest goes one will suffer, and the swamps will dry up -that is what those who reserved the forest said … But at the time that they named it a foreV t classeT e, there wasn 't In the case of Ziama, too, many families around the reserve claimed rights and political authority over land within it on the basis of their ancestors' cultivation there during the nineteenth century when this was a heavilypopulated forest-savanna mosaic.$) These local interests in reserved land and resources, whether political or economic, gave rise to ' encroachments '. The nascent forestry service found these very difficult to prevent, given its highly limited personnel. Forestry was not deemed a staffing or budgetary priority by the central colonial administration. In , Guinea's four forestry inspections had only four forest guards between them so policy implementation relied on the gardes de cercle who were already overburdened with other activities and agendas. In the case of Ziama, local conflict proved such that by  the reserve boundaries had to be re-drawn to allocate more cultivable land in the vicinity of villages.$* Further north, fire-induced vegetation change was now seen to be threatening not only local climate, hydrology and land productivity, but also the downstream flow of the major rivers such as the Niger which took their The forestry service also had limited success in implementing bush fire policies and in its more general attempts to regulate farmers' land and tree management. In the absence of dedicated forestry staff, regulation of bush fire -which by  was supposed to combine prevention of all ' wild ' fires with the controlled and early application of fires deemed useful, such as in farming%" -relied on implementation through the canton chiefs, who were answerable and fineable for contraventions in their territory. But with only the gardes de cercle to rely on, the cercle administration was in no position to enforce these regulations nor the various other restrictions placed on forest felling at this time.
Compounding these problems of policy implementation in the face of local resistance were continuing tensions between forest conservation and other policy objectives. These tensions sometimes led local administrators to remain inactive in the face of contradictory instructions. When addressed head-on, it was usually agricultural concerns which predominated. Thus many commandants de cercle, in the face of pressures from agricultural development and tax collection needs, chose to interpret the  bush fire decree as legitimizing all bush fire for pasture and field preparationcontrary to the interpretations of the forest service.%# The forest service also considered that land tenure laws worked against forest conservation, especially in enabling settlement and farming in the forest region by Maninka immigrants from areas further north. In line with the analyses of scientists such as Adam, foresters generally considered Maninka as ' savanna people ' whose practices were considered to provoke savannization. But while the forest service pushed for greater direct state intervention in land tenure and use, such an overhaul proved impossible given competing pressures from the Agriculture Service and civil administration to maintain the status quo.%$
  
In contrast with earlier decades, the late s and s witnessed a transformation in which environmental policy concerns, and concerns about desiccation within them, came to occupy a central prominence. In this transformation, the relationship between science and administration was crucial. Scientific analyses did not show any major discontinuity -quite the contrary, similar desiccationist arguments were reiterated and strengthened during the s. But this happened in such a way as to allow science to come to constitute development in newly authoritative ways. And whereas earlier conservation had had to respond to local resistance, by the s it could %! ANS G (), Guine! e Service Forestier, rapport Annuel de fin d'anne! e, . %" ' Service de l'Agriculture, Rapport Annuel  ', Institut de Recherche en Agronomie Tropicale, Paris (IRAT) ; Sudres, ' Quelques notes sur la region forestie ' re de la Guine! e française ', IRAT, c. .
%# Ibid. %$ ANS G(), Guine! e Service Forestier, rapport annuel de fin d'anne! e, .
afford to ' forget ' these lessons or to ride more roughshod over those sensitivities, while it also found alliances with certain local agendas and elite perspectives.
This transformation in the status of conservation science in colonial development in the post-Second-World-War era was influenced by a number of linked phenomena. Here we outline several state-science relationships before going on to suggest how, in this context, interactions between aspects of state and local discourse also served to reinforce the place of desiccationism within development.
Of the intra-state phenomena, first was the legacy of the war itself. The war effort had created both imperatives and opportunities to make exacting demands on rural populations, both in labour and in requisitioned products. Cercle administrators, via canton chiefs, extracted wartime rice and palm oil quotas at artificially low prices, and elders remember this as a period of heavy taxation, poverty and hunger, leaving, it seems, a legacy of increased bureaucratic control. While felt throughout the colonial state, this greater ability to extend bureaucracy into rural areas also extended to the agricultural and forestry administrations.
Second and relatedly, the forestry service experienced a significant increase in personnel and administrative capacity. Regional forestry inspectorates were allocated greater resources and were able to employ several forest guards within each cercle. The cercle of Kissidougou, for example, had eight forest guards and one auxiliary by .%% For the first time, this allowed the sustained and systematic implementation of environmental policies and programmes which had long been on the agenda. Modes of implementation were, moreover, explicitly repressive. As in other French colonies, the forest service in Guinea was modeled along military lines, a fact not unconnected with the availability of many decommissioned soldiers following the Second World War. The national director of the forest service in  urged forest guards to act as a ' repressive police force ' and to use draconian military methods.%& Third, and perhaps most significantly, there were new configurations in the production of scientific knowledge for policy. From a handful of scientific consultants and then the heads of struggling forestry administrations, the scientific enterprise had by the late s enlarged considerably. It included forestry and agronomic research centres such as the Centre de Recherche Agronomique at Seredou in the forest region. It included students of these centres and of foreign universities carrying out studies and writing theses under the direction of key scientific figures such as Chevalier, Aubreville, Adam and Schnell. These botanists were now in senior positions, both administratively and intellectually. They had produced major works, such as Aubreville's Climats, foreV ts et desertification de l'Afrique tropicale, which became the authoritative texts in training foresters and botanists and in setting the parameters by which West African environmental change was to be understood more generally. Those informed by such works included the %% ANS G(), Service des Eaux et Fore# ts et Chasses, rapport annuel, . %& R. Rouanet, ' Rapport sur la Guine! e Française ', Premie ' re Confe! rence Forestie ' re Interafricaine, Abidjan - Dec. , deposited in the Direction Nationale des Fore# ts et de la Faune, Conakry, Guinea. social scientists and anthropologists recruited through the colonial administration. While anthropologists such as Denise Paulme, researching among the Kissia in the s, did not directly study deforestation, they framed their works on social change on the assumption that it had taken place, for instance portraying the Kissi settlement as immigration into a once virtually uninhabited, fully forested environment.%' Colonial science was not, of course, homogeneous. Within the consolidated analyses of the s and s debates certainly existed, but these tended to fine-tune rather than to challenge dominant theories. The precise effects of bush fires, for instance, and the relative appropriateness of ' early burning ' versus fire prohibition as a means to control them in different regions of the country were strongly debated without questioning the overarching view that fire was progressively damaging the region's vegetation.%( More challenging views -such as those posed in the critical work of Jeffreys -were ignored or ridiculed, as illustrated in cutting remarks penned by French administrators in the margins of the forest service's copies of Jeffreys' paper.%) Fourth, supporting the growing authority of scientific arguments within West African colonial administrations was their growing globalization. While global scientific networks had always influenced desiccation debates and while the latter were indeed global in origin and claimed universal relevance,%* the late s and early s saw a number of important Africawide conferences and other fora in which ideas were synthesized and their importance for development reinforced in unprecedented ways. These included the first inter-African soils conference held in Goma, Zaire in  and the first inter-African forestry conference held in Abidjan in . Such fora urged not only an internationalism in tackling a common crisis but also a new sense of urgency and immediacy, and in some cases they secured development funds to assist. Desiccationist science was thus strengthened not only in its authority, but in its capacity to command administrators' urgent attention.
Fifth, then, other rural development agendas became linked with environmental ones in new and reinforcing ways. In particular, agricultural agendas, which during - had been to some extent contradictory to environmental agendas and thus supportive of local resistance to conservation policy, became in large part integrated with or at least subordinated to environmental concerns. The new globalized urgency of desiccation discourse was a major factor in this. Thus the master plan for rural development in the cercle of Kissidougou in  stated boldly that ' all must be subordinated to the conservation of soils and forests '.&! Changes in agricultural priorities also played a part. By the late s, under the influence of high world market prices, Guinea's forest region was experiencing a major boom in coffee production. The perceived need to maintain humid climates conducive to high coffee yields had impressed upon the agricultural adminis- tration, too, the importance of forest conservation and its links with climate. As Cole, the director of agriculture for the forest region, argued in , ' the dominant agricultural character of the region is forest, and it is important, above all, to protect this natural wealth by growing only profitable tree crops and using them to replace lost forest, thus avoiding a change in microclimate '.&" Tree crops, the administration's current focus, were seen as compatible with the struggle against desiccation in a way that rice cultivation prioritized earlier was not. Thus contradictions between different departments of the state administration, which had earlier been so significant, were more or less ironed out. By the late s, scientific ideas about deforestation and climatic change thus gained a new authority and pervasiveness as strengthened forestry services implemented the programmes that science had recommended. In effect, implemented policies embedded scientific ideas concerning desiccation in both law and landscape, contributing to their further reinforcement.&# Furthermore, while building on policy ideas that dated from early in the century, they were now put in place with a new scale, scope and lack of compromise. Ironically, desiccationism became a major preoccupation during what is believed to have been the wettest decade of the twentieth century in this part of West Africa (a belief confirmed by the s rainfall statistics for Kissidougou). This underscores the extent to which policy ideas were responding to institutional circumstances rather more than to physical realities.
The late s and early s saw a major wave of forest reservation in the northern part of the forest region, including many small forest patches too controversial for earlier reservation. Furthermore, several reserves that had been created in the early s were ' re-reserved ' by the newly forceful regime, with the acknowledgement that earlier forest protection had been ineffective. This was the case for the forest of Selly Koro in Kissidougou prefecture in , for example, where what the administration saw as encroachment, and villagers saw as re-establishing customary land claims, had been extensive. As a forest service commission explained :
The motivations for the Administration's intervention are the same as in . But today it is even more urgent to halt the indiscriminate clearing which has seriously damaged the forest massif since this time, as a result of insufficient surveillance.&$ Local inhabitants were ' reminded ' of laws inhibiting their clearance of land within the reserve.
The reservation and the reinforced protection of these reserves wrote desiccationist ideas into the landscape. As earlier, many reserves were positioned as curtains to defend the forests against supposed southwards savannization ; many were also created or planned around the headwaters of rivers to protect hydrological relations deemed important for maintaining ' normal ' river flow. The relationship between forest and climate was inscribed at a more general level in the area of forest that planners aimed to reserve. Throughout West Africa, it became ' a rule of thumb ' that in all parts of the forest zone  per cent of the area needed to be under forest (and reserved to ensure this) to maintain climatic conditions.&% All these arguments, as well as the specific recommendations of the Goma soils conference, underlay the funding in  of the plan first discussed in  to regularize the major West African rivers flowing north from Guinea. In , a very grandiose scheme indeed was proposed. It was envisaged that  per cent of the entire upper Niger watershed be placed in large reserves, as well as  per cent of the more densely wooded areas to the south. Pilot schemes were launched on the Milo watersheds of the Niger in the Cercle of Macenta, as well as on the Bafing watersheds in the Fouta Djallon. The work was to be done by force until the inhabitants realised the benefits to be gained.&& Along with these major schemes, forest guards acted throughout Guinea's rural areas to protect the regime's reserves and implement its rules and sanctions concerning bush fire prohibition and externally-directed ' early burning ', and the protection of key tree species from felling and shifting cultivation.
It can be argued that the sum of these transformations was a qualitative change in the relationship between science, policy and practice linked to desiccation. When linked to institutional and bureaucratic forms, the effects of desiccationist thought were now felt deeply in Guinea's rural areas. Attributing these effects to desiccationism rather than to the political economy of control over timber resources is reasonable given that the timber industry was hardly developed and in its existing form experienced few problems of supply. For most rural inhabitants, forestry policies rode roughshod over prior rights and livelihood concerns by imposing prohibitions and fines on local practices involving the management of fire, fallows and land productivity and on the use of plant and animal resources. The forest service came to represent the arm of state bureaucracy with most direct negative influence within remote rural villages.
Oral testimonies from the northern part of Kissidougou -an area where there were not even any major forest reserves -testify to the problematic material effects of desiccation discourse and to the ways villagers responded to them. As an elderly man in the village of Mara recalled, forest guards would pass from village to village during the dry season to fine villagers for setting fires and felling trees. Where no fires were evident, he claimed, guards would set them themselves and then blame villagers. Village chiefs would be approached to pay a lump sum even when fire had clearly originated outside their particular territory and no individual culprit could be found. To deter forest guards from visiting fields, villagers felt obliged to offer generous hospitality and largesse. Whether the payments were official or informal, then, the period is remembered as one of high ' taxes ' to the state and of impoverishment. Both in Mara and a little further south in Sandaya and Yomadou,&' elders emphasize related difficulties in land management. The carefully placed and timed fire-setting so important to protecting settlements, encouraging woody growth in savannas and ensuring productive farming and hunting could be carried out only in ' secret '. And secrecy and worry, in turn, made it difficult to mobilize the whole village in public action to extinguish those fires which did escape control. Hence in the s, many recall, ' running fire ' became a problem for villagers in the forest-savanna mosaic in a hitherto unprecedented way. Equally, the forest department's claims to ownership of a list of ' protected ' tree species and prohibition on felling them were implemented in such a way that farmers lost control over the management of their woody fallows. Whether in streamside gallery forests or on certain enriched upland soils, these woody patches in the savanna had been under the tenurial control of landholding families who relied on their rotational farming for rice and intercrops as part of long-term livelihood strategies. Yet in the s gallery forest farming came to require either a permit or extreme secrecy.&( While contravening many tenets of local tenure arrangements, ecological knowledge and practice as well as morality, state desiccation discourses accorded in a more complementary way with certain other aspects of local discourse in the late colonial context. One set of supportive links arose around discussions of ethnic identity and migration. As we have seen, scientists since the early colonial period had tended to stereotype the Maninka-speaking inhabitants of Guinea's northern regions as ' savanna people ' with more forest destructive farming practices and greater proclivities to fire setting than ' forest people ' such as the Kissia, Guerze and Toma. Maninka migration into the forest zone -an ancient tendency in the Guinean region -was conceptually associated with southwards deforestation, savannization and drying-out, as savanna people supposedly transformed the landscapes they found in accordance with those they had left. Very strong scientific statements were made to this effect in the late s.&) Such stereotypes bore little relevance to local social and ecological experience. For instance, complex family genealogies and migration histories belie any such clarity in ' Maninka ' or ' Kissi ' origins and identities, since many individuals are of mixed descent. And within Kissidougou, there are broad similarities in land use practice across the various language groups, with differences responding far more to in situ ecological and economic specificities than to any ' ethnic ' distinction.&* Nevertheless, the notion of Maninka-induced desiccation could provide a discursive vehicle for raising the real concerns people felt, at times, about cultural and economic domination by powerful immigrant strangers, fears heightened in the more dynamic trading context of the late colonial period. These concerns were evident, for example, in the discussions anthropologist Denise Paulme had with her informants in the late s. Through these, ' the Kissia ' presented themselves as having a cohesive identity linked both to wet rice cultivation and to their ' sacred forest ' institutions and initiation societies which held their activities within the concealment of peri-village forest islands.'! They are also echoed in contemporary statements by Kissi-speaking villagers. As one man described, ' We do not have strangers here ; the Maninka came but the youth banished them because they were enriching themselves on one hand and distracting the young girls on the other '.'" In such circumstances, attributions of environment-related behaviour can be a powerful way of emphasizing difference. Interpreted within local conceptual frameworks, statements such as ' everywhere Maninka settle is dry and open ''# are idioms signifying the possibility of general loss of human and plant fertility and well-being.
A second set of supportive links concerns the ways that the notion of desiccation could be incorporated within local commentary on socioeconomic change and modernity. Breaking key aspects of the moral and political order, especially those surrounding reproductive practices, could, in certain logics, result in drought and infertility. Events which can precipitate climatic disruption include sorcery, breaking of prohibitions concerning the timing and location of reproductive behaviour, felling of particular trees or woodland patches that are the ' homes ' of land spirits, and contravention of particular ancestrally-defined rules linked to the maintenance of village moral order.'$ Desiccation can thus be a moral issue, and stability in rainfall guaranteed by the powers that be and by sticking to codes of moral conduct. The bringing of humidity to a previously parched, barren land is a central theme in origin stories among peoples across the northern forest and savanna zones, whether the humidifying agent is a termite, the breath of God or a python-spirit, all agents with which people must make and uphold social pacts. In part it is the breaking of these pacts that brings infertility and desiccation.
So whilst there are other frames in which inhabitants of the region consider their impact on humidity and vegetation, including the more pragmatic considerations of the impact of cultivation on soil humidity, water infiltration and vegetation, the externally derived scientific concerns with deforestation-led desiccation could feed into existing moralising discourses and the forms of authority they upheld. Guardians of the moral order, whether chiefs and elders or members of the new formally-educated cadre such as teachers thus found the linkages that the administration made between tree-felling, fire-setting and desiccation credible and useful in contexts of challenges to their moral vision and authority, such as in lamenting the wayward tendencies of the young. For example, an elderly Kuranko man talked of worsening fire, the drying of water sources and declining land productivity around his village of Yomadou, in north-west Kissidougou, as part of a discourse on the loss of control of elders over youth since his childhood. ' Then, it was the elders who decided how to manage fire -they commanded ' like this, like that ' … today one tells the youth but they do not listen '.'% When people did have cause to latch on to desiccationist reasoning (although they might consider the causes and consequences very differently), several aspects of ' experiential evidence ' could confirm its relevance in their everyday lives. For instance, the drying-up of particular water sources is one of the most consensual opinions in oral accounts, although unlike most scientists, local people have not linked this fact to generalized deforestation. Thus it appears that in addition to strengthening through transformations within the colonial state and its international relations, desiccation discourse was also influenced by certain state-local and intra-village interactions and experiences. Owing to the way the desiccation logic of colonial conservation could intersect with existing moral discourses and emerging ethnic discourses (as well as with indigenous economic and political interest groups, as Grove highlights in Ghana'&) , it might be overstating the case that colonial forest reservation was a militarized instrument of colonial oppression. To suggest the inverse (as Grove does for Ghana earlier in the century), that ' the general pattern of land use change and forest survival was dictated far less by the colonial state than by indigenous political interest groups in close alliance with the interests of metropolitan capital ','' would nevertheless understate the power of the colonial state in Guinea at this time.
:     
By the s, the colonial state was exhibiting two incongruous tendencies. One tendency, as we have been arguing, was towards a scientific authoritarianism, extending bureaucratic control and infringing local rights in often overtly repressive ways. Yet by this time, the politics of independence had begun and a second tendency was towards a regime increasingly responsive to internal dissent and to the claims of its constituencies. Desiccation science in its institutionally-embodied form, and drawing on its international connections, was increasingly divorced from the realpolitik of state control.
In this context, the domination associated with desiccationism ended up provoking serious dissent. The two incongruous tendencies conflicted with one another, and the colonial science-development apparatus became an explicit target of liberationist struggles. However, it can be argued that this was an exceptional moment in Guinea's environmental politics, providing an opportunity for dissent swiftly superseded by the re-engagement of a ' desiccationist machine ' immediately following independence.'( '% Group discussion with elderly men, Yomadou,  May  (Ku). '& Grove, Ecology, Climate and Empire, . '' Ibid. '( ' Machine ' here is used in the sense of Ferguson's discussion of development in Lesotho as an ' anti-politics machine ', J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine (Cambridge, ) .
In the immediate pre-Independence period, the repressive tactics of the science-empowered ' forest police ' reached such proportions that they became a target of political movements in Guinea.') The extent to which direct protest from rural inhabitants contributed to this is not entirely clear ; villagers had certainly resisted the activities of forest guards, although resistance had tended to be of a hidden kind -such as covert lighting of firesrather than taking the form of open protest movements. Nevertheless, politicians in the run-up to elections found that they could easily rally rural support through slogans such as ' we promise to give you back your lands and forests '.'* This, in turn, led to a disintegration of the dominance and supportive alliances that the environmental services had enjoyed within the state. Once again, the forest service could no longer count on the support of other sectoral administrators. It was forced to reform and faced cuts in funds. And in an attempt to reduce its unpopularity, it was forced to dereserve a number of the forests which it had earlier classified into state control, in many cases less than a decade previously. In , for instance, part of the forest reserve of Selly-Koro was de-reserved, with the Kissidougou forest inspection describing this as ' returning customary agricultural lands to the control of peasant populations '(! for ' humanitarian reasons ' given the suffering of certain villages in the face of a lack of cultivable land.(" In a brief period, then, desiccationist science development had come full circle, emerging from political marginality to a politicssuppressing dominance, only to be marginalized again within the charged political context pre-Independence.
Almost immediately after Guinea's independence in , however, these anti-desiccationist politics rapidly declined, and the science-development agenda, which had dominated in the early s, resumed prominence. Indeed, it did so with even greater force. As we have documented elsewhere,(# the same scientific concerns and the same policy emphases, reinforced by remarkable continuities in administrative personnel, continued to dominate in the post-Independence era. During the First Republic under Se! kou Toure! , they were strongly reinforced by the modernizing, ' de-mystifying ' scientific stance, which the state socialist regime adopted. Along with the massive increase in forest department staff, legal penalties were strengthened, leading in  even to legislation enabling fire-setting to be punishable by death. And more recently, they have been reinforced by the priorities and discourse of international donor agencies within today's globalized environmental policy arena. The programme to regularize the Niger and other rivers was finally launched on a large scale in , with major European and American funding. The extent to which the avowedly new ' decentralized ', ' participatory ' approaches of today's programmes are genuinely different in effect or local perception from the earlier forest police is a question for another day. Suffice to say, the configuration of science, policy and administration has changed rather little and in this context there has been more continuity than rupture.

Debates concerning the relationship between science and policy -and representation and administration -have drawn on a range of theoretical traditions dealing with knowledge and power. Recently, several authors, most notably Ferguson and Escobar, have drawn on interpretations of Foucault's discourse theory to examine the operation of conservation policy in colonial and development contexts.($ Several of their readers have been concerned that these works present the scientific basis of development problematics and the institutions that generate them as overly integrated and as operating as a monolith to reproduce the positions of power in which they are historically located. This is of concern to authors such as Grillo and Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal(% for several reasons. First, they argue, bureaucracies are far from monolithic ; in Guinea, for example, the interests of cultivators, plantations, forest conservation, and timber production have been articulated by different personnel and offices, and have frequently come into conflict in colonial and modern times. Second, subsuming bureaucratic practice into discourse absolves the actors involved of consciousness, intentionality and responsibility in their deployment of science, which at the very least obscures the everyday dilemmas and anxieties faced by colonial administrators and the ways they responded to them. This in turn leads to a third limitation : the reduction of interactions between administrations and local populations to a confrontation of discourses, casting their interaction as one of assimilation or resistance. Yet this approach overlooks how desiccationism, for example, may have allied with particular interests within local politics. And to speak merely of resistance overlooks the ways that unfolding political events in the relationships between local resource users and administrations may lead to transformations in discursive structures. Each of these three critiques is germane to recent studies of the colonial encounter more generally, as exemplified for example in Berman's (and Berman and Lonsdale's) analysis of the colonial state in Kenya. As well as revealing the might of the colonial state, these works also highlight its inherent weaknesses, and the incoherent and ad hoc nature of colonial state activities as political and economic policy was played out in relation to local and metropolitan interests.
(& Yet this analytical tradition has been less attentive to relations of power embodied in discourse, and to ways scientific discourses associated with state policy -or co-produced with it, as Jasanoff and Wynne highlight(' -play out in relation to local and international discourse.
Whilst the potential shortcomings of discourse theory outlined above could be used to reject it, the extent to which these critiques are pertinent could probably be treated more as an historical question than an a priori theoretical consideration. In the case of Guinea, we have argued that desiccationism was a colonial anxiety from the earliest. Yet the configurations in which scientists, administrations and populations interacted during the first few decades of the twentieth century limited the implementation of antidesiccationist policies and frequently forced the adaptation and reworking of those that were implemented. This was mainly because the advice of scientists, generally working as consultants, was easily rejected in the face of more pressing administrative or economic concerns. Implementation of any policy was through the more general administration and thus subject to its agendas, and in this context, local resistance had to be taken seriously.
While this situation began to change in the s with the establishment of forestry services, it is useful to consider it becoming qualitatively different in the post-war period. Science-driven policy gained a strength of its own, supported by regional and global agendas and by a strong administration forged in its image, enabling it to ride roughshod over local political concerns. In this context, in as much as lessons about sensitivity to the politics of resistance -both local and from other branches of the state -had had to be learned during the period -, they were able to be ' forgotten '. The environmental services came to operate as an intrusive and taxing surveillance operation in rural areas, using scientific and technical arguments to extend bureaucratic control into rural areas. Seen from this perspective, independence was not a major rupture with a colonial past, but a brief hiatus in which scientific priorities and concerns could be challenged, if very temporarily. Again, this would echo Berman's analysis in emphasizing the continuity in relations between political economy and state bureaucracy as colonies became independent, although it displaces the focus from political economy to power-knowledge and the autonomy or otherwise of the state in relation to science. The history that emerges from the Guinea case is not of colonial desiccationist science operating as a monolithic discourse from the start, but of scientific and administrative networks that were somewhat divided during the first few decades of the twentieth century, coming together through a series of events to form a powerful discursive coalition.
Lastly, as we have argued, scientific and local discourses have not been solely in opposition to one another in Guinea, which is the impression sometimes given in analyses that treat discourses in more monolithic terms. Indeed a significant influence on the continuity of desiccationism has been the interlocking of scientific ideas with certain aspects of local thought and political positions during ongoing struggles around identity and change. 

This paper examines science-policy interactions associated with desiccationism, a gloss for the drying effects of vegetation loss on climate and soils, in Guinea, West Africa. Drawing mainly on case material from the forest region of Guinea between  and the post-Independence period after , it traces the uneven rise to dominance of desiccationism in policy and its effects. Desiccationism, we argue, was a colonial anxiety from the earliest, but until the s scientists, administrators, and populations interacted in configurations that limited the implementation of anti-desiccation policies and forced their adaptation to local resistance. By the s, however, political and administrative changes, coupled with shifting regional and global agendas, enabled a transformation in the relationship between scientific analysis and bureaucracy. Agricultural and forest policy now aligned closely with desiccationism, extending bureaucratic control and exerting profound -and damaging -effects on rural livelihoods. In the political climate leading up to independence, this colonial science-development apparatus became a target of liberationist struggles, provoking greater heed to local resistance. But this proved to be only a short interlude, and post-Independence policies showed remarkable continuity with those in place earlier. Reflecting on recent theoretical debates, we emphasize that comprehending these shifts requires attention to power-knowledge and state-science relations as well as political economy and to the actual practices, actions and relationships of administrators and populations.
